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POLITICAL LIBERALISM AND THE FATE OF 
UNREASONABLE PEOPLE 
Fuat Gursozlu

 
An unavoidable issue for every liberal democratic theory is 
the question of how liberals should engage with those who reject the 
fundamental values and principles of liberal democracy.  In John 
Rawls’s political liberal project, this issue centers on the discussion 
of unreasonable people.1  The difficulty is that although the distinc-
tion between reasonable and unreasonable has a central place in polit-
ical liberalism, Rawls does not provide a clear answer to the question 
of how liberals should engage with unreasonable people.2  Apart from 
the exclusion of the unreasonable people from the social contract 
meaning,3 Rawls’s concern in Political Liberalism4 is to work out 
which constitutional essentials would be justifiable to reasonable 
people; there is not much in Rawls’s political thought on this issue.5  
Rawls’s remarks, such as the famous footnote in which he states that 
liberals should contain unreasonable doctrines like war and disease, 
only add to the ambiguity of his position.6 
Those who attempted to disambiguate Rawls’s position on the 
fate of unreasonable people have proposed radically different ac-
counts.7  Despite their differences, however, these attempts center on 
the discussion of the question of whether rights and liberties of un-
reasonable people may be infringed in a liberal democratic regime.8  
 
 Loyola University Maryland 
1 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (expanded ed. 2005). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. at 276. 
4 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (expanded ed. 2005). 
5 Id. at 230. 
6 Id. at 64. 
7 See generally Marilyn Friedman, John Rawls and the Political Coercion of Unreasona-
ble People, in THE IDEA OF POLITICAL LIBERALISM 16 (Victoria Davion & Clark Wolf eds., 
2000); see also JONATHAN QUONG, LIBERALISM WITHOUT PERFECTION (2011). 
8 Friedman, supra note 7, at 22; QUONG, supra note 7, at 290. 
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In this article, I suggest that conceiving the place of unreasonable 
people in political liberalism in terms of the limitation of their rights 
and liberties provides a crucially incomplete account.  My claim is 
that by focusing on the question of the rights of unreasonable people, 
the attempts to reconstruct Rawls’s position on unreasonable citizens 
fail to recognize a larger dynamic in political liberalism that sheds 
light on the fate of unreasonable people.  To illustrate my point, I 
concentrate on Marilyn Friedman’s and Jonathan Quong’s attempts to 
reconstruct Rawls’s position on the place of unreasonable people.9  
Friedman argues that political liberalism authorizes restricting the 
rights of unreasonable people, particularly their freedom of expres-
sion, in order to contain unreasonable doctrines and secure the stabil-
ity of the regime.10  Jonathan Quong criticizes Friedman’s interpreta-
tion of Rawls and suggests that Rawls proposes a very narrow range 
of cases in which the rights of unreasonable people may be justifiably 
restricted.11  According to Quong, in a politically liberal society un-
reasonable citizens would not be denied the benefits of citizenship.12  
Differing from these interpretations, I present an alternative account 
implicit in late-Rawls’s thought.  I argue that to reconstruct an accu-
rate account of the fate of unreasonable citizens, one should shift the 
focus from a rights-based approach to the educative effects of politi-
cal liberalism on unreasonable citizens.  This shift reveals the trans-
formative influence of the political liberal regime on unreasonable 
citizens and brings to the fore an account of containment as transfor-
mation. 
The aim of this paper is to challenge the widely accepted in-
terpretations of Rawls and to provide a more accurate account of the 
fate of unreasonable people in political liberalism.  The paper will 
start with a brief examination of the main idea of political liberalism 
and explore the emergence of unreasonable people as a problem.  I 
then focus on Friedman’s and Quong’s accounts of the fate of unrea-
sonable people in political liberalism and show that both approaches 
fail to provide a satisfactory account.  In the third and fourth sections, 
I present a fuller account of the fate of unreasonable people in politi-
cal liberalism.  I first locate the origin of this account in A Theory of 
 
9 Friedman, supra note 7; QUONG, supra note 7. 
10 Friedman, supra note 7, at 23. 
11 QUONG, supra note 7, at 292. 
12 Id. at 293. 
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Justice13 and then turn to Political Liberalism to show that Rawls’s 
position on the status of unreasonable people centers on the refor-
mation of unreasonable citizens over time.14 
I. POLITICAL LIBERALISM AND UNREASONABLE PEOPLE 
Rawls’s Political Liberalism starts with the premise of the ex-
istence of a pluralism of incompatible, yet reasonable, comprehensive 
doctrines.15  Rawls suggests that in a democratic society, with its 
guarantees of basic rights and liberties, a diversity of conflicting 
comprehensive doctrines will always exist.16  This fact of pluralism is 
the result of free exercise of human reason.17  Under the conditions of 
pluralism, a society united on a comprehensive religious, moral, or 
philosophical doctrine is possible “only by the oppressive use of state 
power.”18  As such, Rawls argues that the account of stability defend-
ed in A Theory of Justice, which centers on an ideal of a well-ordered 
society united by a comprehensive philosophical doctrine, is unrealis-
tic.19  Having recognized these facts about a modern democratic soci-
ety and the problem with his account of stability in A Theory of Jus-
tice, Rawls defines the aim of Political Liberalism as to answer the 
question of “[h]ow is it possible that there may exist over time a sta-
ble and just society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by 
reasonable though incompatible religious, philosophical, and moral 
doctrines?”20  Given the fact of reasonable pluralism, Rawls suggests 
that only a political conception of justice could be the focus of an 
overlapping consensus, and thereby, provide the stability of a demo-
cratic society divided by conflicting comprehensive doctrines.21  A 
political conception, unlike a comprehensive doctrine, has limited 
scope and freestanding character.22  While a comprehensive doctrine 
applies to all or almost all areas of life and deals with issues of the 
 
13 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999). 
14 RAWLS, supra note 1, at 199-200. 
15 Id. at 3-4. 
16 Id. at 4-6. 
17 Id. at 4, 36. 
18 Id. at 37; JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 34 (Erin Kelly ed., 
2001). 
19 RAWLS, supra note 1, at xvii. 
20 Id. at xviii. 
21 Id. at 134-37. 
22 Id. at 12, 175-76. 
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good life, value, personal character and virtue, a political conception 
is worked out “for a specific subject, namely, the basic structure of a 
constitutional regime” and is neither derived from nor justified by 
reference to a particular comprehensive religious, philosophical, or 
moral doctrine.23  The distinction is crucial for political liberalism.  
By distinguishing political conceptions from comprehensive doc-
trines, Rawls could defend the view that citizens endorsing conflict-
ing comprehensive doctrines can endorse a political conception of 
justice without giving up their support of their comprehensive doc-
trines.  Thus, Rawls recasts justice as fairness in political terms and 
argues that as a political conception of justice, it could gain the sup-
port of all reasonable citizens. 
The promise of political liberalism is that even under the con-
ditions of pluralism, it is possible to justify certain principles of jus-
tice that could be affirmed as part of an overlapping consensus.  One 
of the fundamental characteristics of a democratic society—the plu-
rality of irreconcilable comprehensive doctrines—does not under-
mine the possibility of a legitimate and stable liberal political order.  
An overlapping consensus is possible because reasonable citizens 
recognize the fact of reasonable disagreement and understand that po-
litical legitimacy cannot rest on one comprehensive doctrine, as there 
is no one doctrine that is affirmed by all or nearly all citizens.  As 
Rawls notes, in a democracy, political power is the power of the pub-
lic and the citizens’ exercise of power can only be fully proper “when 
it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of 
which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to 
endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their com-
mon human reason.”24  Reasonable people affirm this liberal princi-
ple of legitimacy and the relation of reciprocity it fosters with each 
other.  They accept the idea that “[i]t is unreasonable for us to use po-
litical power, should we possess it, or share it with others, to repress 
comprehensive views that are not unreasonable.”25  They are willing 
“to propose fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them provided 
others do.”26  As such, they would support a political conception of 
justice worked out as a freestanding view because it is reasonable. 
As Rawls recognizes, free institutions do not only generate a 
 
23 Id. at 11, 13-14, 175. 
24 RAWLS, supra note 1, at 137. 
25 Id. at 61. 
26 Id. at 54. 
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variety of reasonable doctrines, but they tend to generate a variety of 
comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines.27  Not 
everyone in a democratic society will be able to accept freestanding 
liberal principles of justice and a political order based on these ide-
als.28  For Rawls, anyone who refuses to cooperate with others on 
terms that all can accept and who rejects reasonable pluralism is un-
reasonable.29  And the comprehensive doctrines affirmed by unrea-
sonable people are unreasonable.30  Unreasonable people may not be 
willing to forego their claims for using the coercive power of the state 
in order to establish the hegemony of their own ideas.31  Rawls 
acknowledges that there will always be those who struggle to impose 
the whole truth of their comprehensive doctrine in politics.32  For 
Rawls, insistence on the whole truth in politics is incompatible with 
the ideal of democratic citizenship.33  Political liberalism replies to 
these people by stating that, given the plurality of reasonable doc-
trines, it is unreasonable to use a comprehensive doctrine as the basis 
of constitutional essentials.34  For instance, from the perspective of 
political liberalism, those who may claim that outside the church 
there is no salvation, and thus, the constitutional essentials based on 
liberal values must be rejected, are politically unreasonable.35  They 
propose to use political power to reshape the constitutional essentials 
by forcibly imposing a comprehensive religious doctrine that citizens 
differ uncompromisingly.36  Rejecting reasonable disagreement 
would imply the idea that the proponents of one comprehensive doc-
trine have priority over the others in using the coercive power of the 
state.37  However, the alleged priority cannot be justified given the 
fact of reasonable pluralism.38  In political liberalism, the idea of po-
litically reasonable replaces the idea of truth and right based on com-
 
27 Id. at 3-4. 
28 Id. at 60. 
29 RAWLS, supra note 1, at 61-62. 
30 Id. at 62. 
31 Id. at 64-65. 
32 Id. at 50. 
33 Id. at 243. 
34 RAWLS, supra note 1, at 138. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 138-39. 
38 Id. at 138. 
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prehensive doctrines.39  Unreasonable people claim that the truth of 
their comprehensive doctrines, religious or philosophical, outweighs 
the politically reasonable.40  Rawls underlines that “political liberal-
ism does not engage” with people who think in this way.41 
Political liberalism is interested in which principles of justice 
would be justifiable to reasonable people and it addresses reasonable 
people for an overlapping consensus.42  This means that the views of 
unreasonable people are simply irrelevant from the outset.43  The rea-
sons provided for the defense of political liberalism are neither aimed 
at unreasonable people nor would succeed in convincing them.44  Yet, 
there will always be those who believe that the institutions that gov-
ern their lives are based on values and ideas that they cannot en-
dorse.45  These citizens will recognize that the political regime sees 
them as a threat to its own existence.46  As Rawls points out, actual 
societies “will normally contain numerous unreasonable doctrines” 
and these doctrines are a threat to democratic institutions.47  Moreo-
ver, Rawls adds, “[t]heir existence sets a limit to the aim of fully real-
izing a reasonable democratic society with its ideal of public reason 
and the idea of legitimate law.”48  Unreasonable people create a prob-
lem for the stability and unity of the liberal political regime as well as 
its full realization.49  They cannot support a democratic regime and 
 
39 See RAWLS, supra note 1, at 488 (noting that the idea is that politically reasonable is 
sufficient when the issue is of matters of basic justice and constitutional essentials). 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 442. 
42 RAWLS, supra note 13, at 339-40. 
43 Id. at 340 (asserting that so long as reciprocity is fulfilled, the views of the unreasonable 
people are cancelled out by the majority). 
44 See Jean Hampton, The Common Faith of Liberalism, 75 PAC. PHIL. Q. 186, 210-11 
(1994) (arguing that the idea of reasonable has illiberal tones); see also Steve Scalet, Legiti-
macy, Confrontation Respect, and the Bind of Freestanding Liberalism, 41 J. SOC. PHIL. 92, 
95-96 (2011) (arguing that by avoiding a comprehensive intellectual exchange liberals disre-
spect unreasonable people). 
45 Scalet, supra note 44, at 94. 
46 See Martha Nussbaum, Political Soul-Making and the Imminent Demise of Liberal Ed-
ucation, 37 J. SOC. PHIL. 301, 307 (2006); Martha Nussbaum, Perfectionist Liberalism and 
Political Liberalism: A Response to Joseph Raz, UNIV. OF CHI. LAW SCH. FAC. BLOG (Nov. 
08, 2008, 2:15 PM), http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2008/11/perfectionist-l.html.  
Nussbaum uses the concept of ‘expressive subordination’ to describe the status of non-liberal 
citizens living in a perfectionist liberal society.  Yet, she fails to recognize that unreasonable 
citizens living in a political liberal regime live under similar conditions. 
47 RAWLS, supra note 1, at 488-89. 
48 Id. at 489. 
49 Id. 
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they are not part of the overlapping consensus.50  Political liberalism 
argues that a consensus albeit a limited one is possible even under the 
conditions of plurality, but it does not say much about the status of 
unreasonable people in a well-ordered society.51  We are left with 
several significant questions. How should liberals deal with those 
who oppose a liberal order?  What is the status of reasonable citizens 
in a well-ordered society?  What is awaiting the unreasonable people 
in a political liberal regime? 
II. THE STATUS OF UNREASONABLE CITIZENS: TWO ACCOUNTS 
OF CONTAINMENT 
Does Rawls’s political liberalism have something to say re-
garding the fate of unreasonable people in a well-ordered society?  
Reconstructing Rawls’s position on this issue is a challenging task 
because Rawls does not give a clear answer to the question of how 
liberals should deal with the unreasonable people.  Commentators 
have tried to provide a coherent account by focusing on the very few 
passages in Political Liberalism where Rawls addresses the issue.52  
These efforts have led to two main interpretations—one by Marilyn 
Friedman and the other by Jonathan Quong—that are in conflict with 
each other.53 
Friedman first draws attention to the exclusionary implica-
tions of political liberalism and then proposes an account of strong 
containment by arguing that for those who endorse unreasonable doc-
trines there is more at stake in Rawls’s political liberalism than simp-
ly being excluded from the constituency of political liberalism.54  
Friedman claims that the political autonomy of the unreasonable citi-
zen is violated by Rawls’s legitimation methods.55  According to 
Friedman, the consent or dissent of the unreasonable people are irrel-
evant for the legitimacy of the politically liberal regime since the le-
 
50 Hampton, supra note 44, at 210. 
51 RAWLS, supra note 1, at 487. 
52 Id. at 483, 489. 
53 Friedman, supra note 7, at 16-33; Jonathan Quong, The Rights of Unreasonable Citi-
zens, 12 THE J. OF POL. PHIL. 314 (2004). 
54 Friedman, supra note 7, at 22. 
55 Id. at 17 (concerning the political autonomy and freedom of the unreasonable citizens 
who withhold their consent from political liberalism.  The fact that one is unreasonable does 
not mean that one will not endorse the system, though their consent would be irrelevant for 
the legitimacy of the regime). 
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gitimacy of the liberal democratic institutions solely depends on the 
consent of the reasonable people.56  Unreasonable people are exclud-
ed from the “legitimation pool”, that is, they are not part of “the pool 
of persons whose endorsement would confirm the legitimacy of 
Rawls’s political liberalism—or whose rejection would confirm its 
illegitimacy.”57  For Friedman, it follows that not only the opinions of 
the unreasonable people are irrelevant, but also that the state is enti-
tled to exercise its coercive power over unreasonable people without 
their consent.58  The important point here, for Friedman, is that exclu-
sion of the unreasonable people from the legitimation pool is only 
part of what is awaiting the unreasonable people in political liberal-
ism.59  Pointing out the well-known footnote in which Rawls says 
that unreasonable doctrines should be contained like war and disease, 
she suggests that in daily life unreasonable citizens “will be denied 
the full protection of the system’s basic rights and liberties, particu-
larly freedom of expression.”60  As such, she concludes, those who 
reject the basic freedoms “will be treated like the bearers of a pesti-
lence.”61 
In response to Friedman, Jonathan Quong argues that Fried-
man’s interpretation of Rawls is “obviously incorrect” since for 
Rawls “there is not one account of toleration for reasonable doctrines 
and another for unreasonable ones.”62  As Quong points out, Rawls 
clearly states that “[b]oth cases are settled by the appropriate political 
principles of justice and the conduct those principles permit. . . .”63  
The fact that unreasonable citizens are excluded from the constituen-
cy of public justification does not mean that benefits of citizenship do 
not extend to them.64  For Quong, Friedman and those who endorse a 
similar interpretation of Rawls simply misunderstand the social 
contractarian reasoning.65  Quong notes that the principles of justice 
derived in the original position holds for everyone “and not just those 
 
56 Id. at 16. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Friedman, supra note 7, at 17. 
60 Id. at 22-23. 
61 Id at 23. 
62 Quong, supra note 53, at 316. 
63 Id.; see generally QUONG, supra note 7, at 290-314. 
64 Quong, supra note 53, at 316. 
65 Id. at 317. 
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citizens who happen to endorse their premises.”66  Therefore, Quong 
concludes, in Rawls’s political liberalism there are no a priori rea-
sons to deny unreasonable people the benefits of citizenship.67 
As Quong states, even if the unreasonable people are not ex-
cluded from the benefits of citizenship, there “may be additional rea-
sons why we would be justified in” denying the basic rights or other 
liberties of unreasonable citizens.68  Quong advances his account of 
weak containment which suggests that Rawls proposes a very narrow 
range of cases in which the rights of the unreasonable people may be 
justifiably restricted.69  At this point, Quong rightly points out that, 
according to Rawls, the normative stability of the liberal democratic 
regime depends on whether it is capable of generating its own sup-
port.70  If citizens do not see the fundamental institutions of liberal 
democracy as worthy of their support and enough people reject the 
basic rights and liberties, then an overlapping consensus becomes 
impossible.71  Therefore, Quong concludes, it is “essential that doc-
trines which deny the freedom and equality of persons not become so 
prevalent that they threaten to undermine the essentials of a liberal 
democratic regime.”72  On this reading of Rawls, the normative sta-
bility of liberal democracy justifies containment of unreasonable doc-
trines as a legitimate political objective.  Put differently, unreasona-
ble doctrines need to be contained since they threaten the stability of 
the regime. 
To uncover the implications of Rawls’s position, it is impera-
tive to understand what containment of unreasonable doctrines en-
tails.  Unfortunately, nowhere does Rawls explain what exactly he 
means by “contain”; thus, as Quong points out, “we are forced to de-
cide” what he means.73  Quong suggests that containment of unrea-
sonable doctrines can be described as “any policy whose primary in-
tention is to undermine or restrict the spread of ideas that reject the 
fundamental tenets of liberal democracy. . . .”74  The question then is 
when it is permissible to implement policies to restrict the spread of 
 
66 Id. at 316. 
67 Id. at 317. 
68 Id. 
69 Quong, supra note 53, at 324-25. 
70 Id. at 324. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 323 (emphasis added). 
74 Quong, supra note 53, at 323. 
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unreasonable doctrines.  Quong concludes that apart from the most 
extreme circumstances, such as when subversive advocacy is “both 
directed to inciting imminent and unlawful use of force and [is] likely 
to achieve this result,” there is no other case in which the rights of the 
unreasonable citizens may be justifiably infringed for the sake of the 
normative stability of the regime.75 
III.        EXPLORING THE TENSION 
Both accounts of containment seem to recognize the tension 
in Rawls’s political theory between the need to contain unreasonable 
doctrines and the rights and liberties that Rawls’s theory accords to 
all citizens.  But, they approach the tension in different ways. 
Based on Rawls’s remarks on the practical political task of 
containing unreasonable doctrines, Friedman proposes an account of 
strong containment by suggesting that containment requires “regulat-
ing and controlling the media in which it is expressed and promulgat-
ed – books, magazines, cyberspace, and so on” as well as “suppress-
ing those who hold the doctrine, in particular, suppressing their 
expression [of] and/or enactment of it.”76  In doing so, Friedman de-
cides to deepen the tension, rather than exploring it by asking wheth-
er there are other ways to interpret containment that could be sup-
ported by the Rawlsian framework or whether there are aspects of 
Rawls’s theory that limits her interpretation of Rawls.77  However, as 
Quong rightly points out, she seems to ignore certain points in 
Rawls’s theory that undermine her interpretation.78  Recognizing the 
tension in Rawls’s thought, Quong decides to resolve it by arguing 
that, according to Rawls, the argument for the normative stability of 
the regime might justify violating the rights of the unreasonable peo-
ple.79  Thus, the need to contain unreasonable doctrines like war and 
disease appears as a legitimate political objective, thereby accommo-
dating the tension between the framework of rights and liberties and 
containment of unreasonable people. 
Quong’s account of the status of the unreasonable people in 
political liberalism seems to be the widely accepted one.  Joshua Co-
 
75 Id. at 323-24 (quoting RAWLS, supra note 1, at 348). 
76 Friedman, supra note 7, at 22-23. 
77 Id. 
78 Quong, supra note 53, at 316-17. 
79 Id. at 314. 
10
Touro Law Review, Vol. 30 [2014], No. 1, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss1/4
2014] THE FATE OF UNREASONABLE PEOPLE 45 
hen, for example, points out that Rawls’s remarks on the need to con-
tain unreasonable doctrines does not “imply that we may do whatever 
we judge appropriate for containing objectionable views, any more 
than we can fight a disease by simply quarantining people who are 
sick.”80  Similar to Quong, Cohen refers to Rawls’s discussion of the 
right of subversive advocacy as well as his discussion of the tolerat-
ing the intolerant to support his point.81  Martha Nussbaum also 
points out Rawls’s discussion of subversive advocacy while endors-
ing the account of weak containment.82  For Nussbaum, “Rawls’s 
highly protective doctrine of free political speech suggests that [the 
speech of the unreasonable people] may be limited only in the sort of 
emergency that amounts to a constitutional crisis.”83  According to 
Nussbaum, containment refers to the need to entrench the major lib-
erties in a constitution, “and thus doctrines that propose the elimina-
tion of one or more of these liberties cannot come up as simple legis-
lative proposals.”84 
At first glance, the account of weak containment seems to be 
a satisfactory interpretation of Rawls’s position.  A significant prob-
lem with this interpretation appears when Rawls’s argument for the 
normative stability of the liberal democratic regime is taken serious-
ly.85  Quong rightly points out that Rawls’s argument for the norma-
tive stability of the regime is based on the idea that normative stabil-
ity calls for a reasonable, overlapping consensus which is impossible 
if enough people reject the basic values of political liberalism.86  As 
such, it is essential that unreasonable doctrines do not become so 
prevalent “that they threaten to undermine the essentials of a liberal 
democratic regime.”87  This argument justifies infringing the rights of 
unreasonable citizens in certain cases.  And Rawls suggests a very 
narrow range of cases in which the argument for containment applies 
and, as Quong also recognizes, these cases, such as imminent revolt, 
 
80 Joshua Cohen, A More Democratic Liberalism, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1503, 1538 n.134 
(1994). 
81 Id. 
82 See generally Martha Nussbaum, Perfectionist Liberalism and Political Liberalism, 39 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (2011). 
83 Id. at 23. 
84 Id. at 24. 
85 Quong, supra note 53, at 324. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
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are not that relevant today in modern constitutional democracies.88  
Yet, it seems rather odd that given the argument for the stability of 
the regime and the need to contain unreasonable doctrines to preserve 
the unity and justice of society, the only practical political suggestion 
Rawls seems to consider is the restriction of the rights of the unrea-
sonable people when the unreasonable become strong enough to act 
to overturn the institutions of the regime itself.  The point is not that 
Rawls proposes more cases in which restricting the rights of the un-
reasonable is justified, rather it is that given the centrality of the nor-
mative stability of the regime, the issue of containment may not only 
be about restricting the rights and liberties of unreasonable citizens.  
When one considers Rawls’s argument for the normative stability to-
gether with Quong’s account of weak containment, one cannot help 
but wonder whether this is all Rawls says on the issue. 
According to Quong’s interpretation of Rawls, in a political 
liberal regime unreasonable people would enjoy their basic rights and 
liberties until they grow very strong and decide to act to overthrow 
the institutions of liberal democratic regime.89  But, Rawls clearly 
states that “[u]nreasonable doctrines are a threat to democratic insti-
tutions, since it is impossible for them to abide by a constitutional re-
gime except as a modus vivendi.” 90  Once Rawls identifies the main 
threat to the liberal democratic regime, he acknowledges that their 
existence is a “permanent fact of life, or seems so.”91  And since a 
well-ordered society requires that the dominant and controlling citi-
zens endorse a reasonable political conception of justice, “[t]his gives 
us the practical task of containing them –like war and disease- so that 
they do not overturn political justice.”92  However, if containment, as 
Quong suggests, refers only to policies that restrict or undermine the 
spread of ideas that reject basic values of liberal democracy, then it 
seems that Rawls emphasizes the need to restrict or undermine the 
spread of unreasonable doctrines so that they will not become preva-
lent and threaten to undermine the essentials of a liberal democratic 
regime, which calls for policies that can only be effective over rela-
tively long time periods, while arguing that it is justified to contain 
 
88 Id. at 324-25. 
89 Id. at 314, 317, 323-24, 334-35. 
90 RAWLS, supra note 1, at 489 (emphasis in original). 
91 Id. at 64 n.19. 
92 Id. (emphasis added). 
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unreasonable doctrines only when there is immediate danger.93  
Quong’s interpretation by coupling containment with the issue of 
rights of unreasonable citizens creates another tension in Rawls’s 
thought which Quong fails to recognize. It is important to notice here 
that Rawls’s concern is not whether the liberal majority has the right 
to restrict the rights of the unreasonable minority, which is an issue 
he briefly discusses elsewhere.94  Rather, it is the development of rea-
sonable citizens in appropriate numbers to maintain an enduring lib-
eral society.95  By centering his account of containment around the 
issue of rights and liberties of unreasonable people, Quong fails to 
explore whether Rawls’s theory could support an alternative account 
of containment.96  In doing so, he downplays the force of the argu-
ment for normative stability as well as Rawls’s concern for the nor-
mative stability of the regime.97 
The argument for the normative stability draws attention to 
the fact that if enough citizens reject basic values of political liberal-
ism and become prevalent stability is impossible.  So, the aim is to 
prevent the unreasonable from becoming so prevalent that they 
threaten to undermine the essentials of a liberal democratic regime.  
Thus, a liberal political regime should generate sufficient support for 
itself and thereby establish and preserve stability.  An account of con-
tainment that is supported by Rawls’s political thought should take 
seriously the importance of this core idea.  Seen from this perspec-
tive, Rawls’s political liberal project offers another mechanism to 
contain the unreasonable thereby ensuring that dominant and control-
ling citizens are reasonable.  In the rest of the article, I suggest that to 
understand what the argument for containment amounts to it is neces-
sary to explore the tension rather than trying to overcome or deepen 
it. 
 
93 Quong, supra note 53, at 314-15, 323-24, 326-29, 334-35. 
94 See RAWLS, supra note 13, at 197 (introducing the possibility that Rawls’s suggests 
working towards the improvement of reasonable citizens rather than constraining those who 
are unreasonable). 
95 Quong, supra note 53, at 328. 
96 Id. at 314-18, 322-31. 
97 Id. at 314, 324-26, 328-30, 334.  This is rather surprising since Quong later appeals to 
Rawls’s argument for the normative stability to argue that it might be used to justify restrict-
ing or withholding the rights of unreasonable people when the issue at stake is education of 
children and the dissemination of hate speech and literature.  Id. at 326. 
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IV. THE CORE OF CONTAINMENT AS TRANSFORMATION 
The dominant interpretation advanced by Quong is correct in-
sofar as one proposes an account of containment that solely centers 
on the issue of rights of unreasonable people.  One who follows 
Quong’s steps in reconstructing Rawls’s account of containment 
could arrive at the conclusion he proposes.  However, once one turns 
to the educative effects of the liberal political regime on the lives of 
citizens and the role it plays in Rawls’s political liberalism, a differ-
ent account of containment comes to the fore.98  Seen from this per-
spective, what Rawls means by contain and the fate of unreasonable 
citizens in political liberalism takes on a different meaning. And the 
dominant interpretation proves to be lacking a significant dimension 
of Rawls’s account of containment. 
Recall that when Quong argues that Friedman obviously mis-
interprets Rawls, he refers to the passage in The Idea of Public Rea-
son Revisited99 in which Rawls states that actual societies normally 
contain unreasonable doctrines and “how far [they] may be active and 
are to be tolerated in a constitutional democratic regime” is not a new 
challenge.100  Rawls continues by emphasizing that “[t]here is not one 
account of toleration for reasonable doctrines and another for unrea-
sonable ones.”101  Both cases are settled by the appropriate political 
principles of justice and the conduct those principles permit.”102  In 
the footnote following this sentence Rawls refers to two critical sec-
tions—one in A Theory of Justice and the other in Political Liberal-
ism—both of which are surprisingly neglected by theorists who en-
dorse the rights based account of containment.103  Yet, both 
 
98 The literature on the role transformative effects of the political order plays in Rawls’ 
political liberalism is vast.  See Ed Wingenbach, Unjust Context: The Priority of Stability in 
Rawls’s Contextualized Theory of Justice, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 213, 213, 222 (1999); Sheldon 
Wolin, The Liberal Democratic Divide. On Rawls’s Political Liberalism, 24 POL. THEORY 
98, 98, 111 (1996); e.g. Patrick Neal, Vulgar Liberalism, 21 POL. THEORY 623, 623, 626, 
635-37 (1993); e.g. Russell Muirhead & Nancy L. Rosenblum, Political Liberalism vs. ‘The 
Great Game of Politics’: The Politics of Political Liberalism, 4 PERSP. ON POL. 99, 99-100, 
102, 105 (1996); e.g. Steven Macedo, Transformative Constitutionalism and the Case of Re-
ligion: Defending the Moderate Hegemony of Liberalism, 26 POL. THEORY 1-3, 9, 13 (1998); 
e.g. Cohen, supra note 80, at 1504-07, 1530-31,1546. 
99 QUONG, supra note 7, at 292. 
100 JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES: THE IDEA OF PUBLIC REASON REVISITED 178 
(2002). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id.; RAWLS, supra note 13, at 190-94; RAWLS, supra note 1, at 197-200. 
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references are important in understanding the fate of the unreasonable 
in political liberalism. 
First, Rawls references the section “Toleration of the Intoler-
ant” in Theory.104  In this section, Rawls argues that although the in-
tolerant sect has no “title to complain if it is not tolerated,” it still 
does not follow from this that “tolerant sects have the right to sup-
press them.”105 The tolerant have a right to curb the intolerant “when 
they sincerely and with reason believe that intolerance is necessary 
for their own security.”106  The more challenging question is whether 
the tolerant have the right not to tolerate the intolerant when the in-
tolerant “are of no immediate danger to the equal liberties of oth-
ers.”107  Rawls concludes that “when the constitution itself is secure, 
there is no reason to deny freedom to the intolerant.”108  The guiding 
principle should be that the freedom of an intolerant sect should be 
restricted “only when the tolerant sincerely and with reason believe 
that their own security and that of the institutions of liberty are in 
danger.”109 Rawls continues by pointing out how the question of tol-
erating the intolerant relate to the stability of a well-ordered society, 
which reveals the core of the idea of containment as transfor-
mation.110 
At this point, Rawls indicates that “[i]f an intolerant sect ap-
pears in a well-ordered society, the others should keep in mind the 
inherent stability of their institutions.”111  It is important to recognize 
that protecting “[t]he liberties of the intolerant may persuade them to 
a belief in freedom” and thus the intolerant acquires an allegiance to 
the institutions of the well-ordered society over a period of time.112  
The underlying assumption is that “those whose liberties are protect-
ed by and who benefit from a just constitution will, other things 
equal, acquire an allegiance to it over a period of time.”113  Rawls 
calls this the “psychological principle.”114  An intolerant sect “will 
 
104 RAWLS, supra note 13, at 190. 
105 Id. at 190-91. 
106 Id. at 192. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 RAWLS, supra note 13, at 193. 
110 Id. at 193-94. 
111 Id. at 192. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 RAWLS, supra note 13, at 192. 
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tend to lose its intolerance . . . provided that it is not so strong initial-
ly that it can impose its will straightway, or does not grow so rapidly 
that the psychological principle has no time to take hold . . . .”115  
Rawls’s emphasis on the transformative effects of tolerating the in-
tolerant indicates that there is more to the policy of containment than 
the rights based interpretation entails.116  Rawls’s remarks in this par-
agraph introduce the possibility of an alternative account of contain-
ment which centers around the educative effects of living in a well-
ordered regime on citizens’ development and their idea of the 
good.117  However, Rawls recognizes that the forces that maintain the 
stability of just institutions cannot always convert the intolerant, es-
pecially when the “intolerant sect [is] so strong initially or growing 
so fast . . . .”118  In this case, Rawls says, we are faced with a “practi-
cal dilemma which philosophy alone cannot resolve.”119  The just in-
stitutions have a natural strength to transform the intolerant, whereas 
it should not be “supposed that tendencies to depart from them go un-
checked and always win out.”120  Thus, Rawls suggests, “[w]hether 
the liberty of the intolerant should be limited to preserve freedom un-
der a just constitution depends on the circumstances.”121  The im-
portant point here is that the tension that both Friedman and Quong 
deal with first emerges in Theory between citizens’ natural duty of 
justice to uphold a just constitution, which includes protecting the 
rights and liberties of the intolerant, and the need to preserve “our . . . 
legitimate interests” and the institutions of the just regime by curbing 
the intolerant.122  Rawls acknowledges the dilemma, yet he does not 
resolve it.123  It is a practical dilemma, the solution of which depends 
on how tolerant citizens perceive the circumstances.124  It is important 
to notice here that this practical dilemma need not arise if the liberal 
democratic regime could successfully transform the intolerant over 
time.125  The educative political implications of tolerating the intoler-
 
115 Id. at 192-93. 
116 Id. at 192. 
117 Id. at 192-93. 
118 Id. at 193. 
119 RAWLS, supra note 13, at 193. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 192. 
123 RAWLS, supra note 1, at 198. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 195. 
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ant constitute the core of the account of containment, which takes a 
more complex form in Political Liberalism.126 
V. CONTAINMENT AS TRANSFORMATION 
The second reference in the footnote -Lecture V section 6.2 in 
Political Liberalism- points out a similar, but subtler version of trans-
formation and thus it is essential for an accurate understanding of the 
fate of the unreasonable in Rawls’s political liberalism.127  In this sec-
tion, Rawls discusses the question of whether justice as fairness is 
fair to the conceptions of the good. The issue is that “if some concep-
tions [of the good] will die out and others survive only barely in a just 
constitutional regime,” it may seem unfair to them.128  And it might 
even appear “unjust to the people whose conceptions they are, or 
might be.”129  Rawls’s reply to this criticism provides the first dimen-
sion of the politics of containment.130  Rawls states that the political 
conception of justice is not “unfair to them [because] social influ-
ences favoring some doctrines over others cannot be avoided by any 
view of political justice.”131  Referencing Berlin, he says that “there is 
no social world without loss.”132  One may lament the limited space 
of the social worlds, but one must recognize that every social world 
has to exclude some ways of life.  The basic structure of the regime, 
shaped by the two principles of justice, “inevitably encourage[s] 
some ways of life and discourage[s] others, or even exclude[s] them 
altogether.”133  To be sure, political liberalism is neutral in terms of 
its aims since it does not do anything intended to favor or promote 
any particular comprehensive doctrine or assist those who pursue it.  
This does not mean that political liberalism is neutral in terms of its 
effects on society.  The basic structure unintentionally has “important 
effects and influences as to which comprehensive doctrines endure 
and gain adherents over time.”134  As Rawls notes, there is nothing 
that can be done about it but for accepting “the facts of commonsense 
 
126 Id. at 200. 
127 Id. at 198. 
128 RAWLS, supra note 1, at 197. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 RAWLS, supra note 1, at 195. 
134 Id. at 193. 
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political sociology.”135  Accordingly, seeking neutrality of effect or 
influence is futile and impractical.  As such, political liberalism 
abandons the idea of neutrality of effect.  The inevitable effects are 
the effects of culture and social structure; it is the “culture and institu-
tions [that] prove[] too uncongenial.”136  So, political liberalism is not 
biased towards certain comprehensive doctrines.  Yet, some compre-
hensive doctrines and especially those that are in conflict with the 
basic values of the liberal democratic regime may “fail to gain adher-
ents under the political and social conditions of a just constitutional 
regime.”137 
The discussion of the transformative effects of political liber-
alism continues with the discussion of the education of children, 
which constitutes the other dimension of the account of containment 
as transformation.  The issue here is the education of the children of 
the religious minorities who “oppose the culture of the modern world 
and wish to lead their common life apart from its unwanted influ-
ences.”138  Rawls states that political liberalism requires that chil-
dren’s education should include such things as knowledge of their 
constitutional and civic rights, “prepare them to be fully cooperating 
members of society, and enable them to be self-supporting [while] 
encourag[ing] [] political virtues so that they want to honor the fair 
terms of social cooperation in their relations with the rest of socie-
ty.”139  At this point, it is important to note that Rawls’s list of virtues 
include tolerance, civility, reasonableness, and fairness.140  These four 
political virtues capture the fundamental ideas of political liberalism. 
For Rawls, the political virtues serve as the means “through which 
those principles [of justice] are embodied in human character and ex-
pressed in public life.”141  To secure citizen’s allegiance to the basic 
values and institutions of a fully just democratic society these virtues 
must be cultivated and encouraged.142 
Many political theorists have argued that the educational im-
plications of Rawls’s political liberalism is “substantially same” with 
 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 197. 
137 Id. at 196. 
138 RAWLS, supra note 1, at 199. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 139, 157, 163, 195, 217, 224. 
141 Id. at 147. 
142 Id. at 467. 
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the aims of comprehensive liberalism.  For instance, Eamonn Callan 
argues that teaching the political virtues of political liberalism is no 
different than teaching the substantial ethical idea of autonomy.143  
Richard Dagger suggests that political liberalism educates “children 
in the light of a particular conception of the good.”144  Rawls 
acknowledges that this may happen.  His reply is that those who ar-
gue that once their children have been subjected to the civic educa-
tion required by the political conception their way of life will not sur-
vive by emphasizing that, “the unavoidable consequences of 
reasonable requirements for children’s education may have to be ac-
cepted, often with regret.”145 
For Rawls, education at home is an important part of chil-
dren’s education.146  Elsewhere, he remarks that “[t]he family must 
ensure the nurturing and development of such citizens in appropriate 
numbers to maintain an enduring society.”147  “The family is part of 
the basic structure of the society” and one of its aims is the “orderly 
production and reproduction of society and its culture from one gen-
eration to the next.”148  However, Rawls is very well aware that edu-
cation at home may also inculcate “habits of thought and ways of 
feeling and conduct incompatible with democracy.”149  For instance, 
the injustices in the family “tend to undermine children’s capacity to 
acquire the political virtues required of future citizens in a viable 
democratic society.”150  If that is the case, the principles of justice can 
be invoked to reform the family.  What is at stake here is to inculcate 
political virtues thereby shaping children’s beliefs, thoughts, and de-
sires from the early ages both at home and in school.  As Nussbaum 
rightly indicates, one of the most important educational tasks of the 
Rawlsian state is the cultivation of “sentiments and attitudes required 
by the political conception and its replication over time.”151 The aim 
 
143 Eamonn Callan, Political Liberalism and Political Education, 58 THE REV. OF POL. 5, 
22 (1996); EAMONN CALLAN, CREATING CITIZENS: POLITICAL EDUCATION AND LIBERAL 
DEMOCRACY 40 (2004). 
144 RICHARD DAGGER, CIVIC VIRTUE: RIGHTS, CITIZENSHIP AND REPUBLICAN LIBERALISM 
190 (1997). 
145 RAWLS, supra note 1, at 200. 
146 Id. at 199-200. 
147 Id. at 467. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 470. 
150 RAWLS, supra note 1, at 470. 
151 Nussbaum, supra note 46, at 304. 
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is to shape citizens’ doctrines by “inculcat[ed] habits of thought and 
ways of feeling and conduct” which in turn lies at the heart of politi-
cal liberalism.152 
The central idea is the reformation of those whose way of life 
is in conflict with the basic values of the regime or who reject them 
outright.153  Rawls references these sections while discussing what 
the liberal democratic regime should do about the unreasonable peo-
ple.154  He recognizes the existence of unreasonable doctrines and 
then points out that how far we should curb them is a complex issue, 
which is followed by the two references.155  To be sure, these are not 
the only sections of Political Liberalism in which Rawls discusses the 
political order’s effects on citizens.156  Rawls’s discussion of how po-
litical liberalism is possible centers on the educative effects of the po-
litical order.157  In a nutshell, the main idea is that an effective politi-
cal conception of justice shapes and bends comprehensive doctrines 
towards itself and moves them slowly “from unreasonable to reason-
able.”158  Rawls suggests that as the success of a political conception 
and just institutions continue over time, citizens tend to develop trust 
in political institutions and procedures, and gain confidence in one 
another.159  This trust, in turn, initiates an allegiance to the principles 
of a liberal constitution.160  Rawls envisions that this process happens 
slowly over time and the unreasonable views tend to change and be-
come reasonable.161  Within this process, “simple pluralism moves 
toward reasonable pluralism.”162  This larger political dynamic in po-
litical liberalism supports the account of containment as transfor-
mation.  It shows that containment as transformation is not an excep-
tion, but part of a larger dynamic that lies at the heart of political 
liberalism. 
 
152 RAWLS, supra note 1, at 470. 
153 Id. at 467; Callan, supra note 143, at 13. 
154 RAWLS, supra note 1, at 467. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 138-39. 
157 Id. at 247-54. 
158 Id. at 246 (replying to the criticism that political liberalism is utopian). 
159 RAWLS, supra note 1, at 163. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 163. 
162 Id. at 164. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The account of containment in political liberalism is the result 
of the fundamental concern that the unreasonable minority should not 
grow so strong and become a threat to the liberal democratic regime.  
One way to contain unreasonable doctrines is described by Friedman. 
But, her interpretation is not warranted by Rawls’s writings.  Quong’s 
interpretation, however, does not take seriously the main idea of 
Rawls’s argument for the normative stability of the regime and thus 
he does not recognize the traces of another account of containment.  
Both theorists fail to explore the possibilities of Rawls’s thought that 
could offer alternative mechanisms for dealing with the existence of 
unreasonable people. 
The transformative account moves the discussion of the fate 
of unreasonable citizens from a rights-based problem to that of de-
veloping reasonable citizens in a liberal political regime.  This is not 
to deny the relevance of a rights-based interpretation.  Rather, by em-
phasizing the centrality of the idea of transformation of citizens, it 
seeks to provide a complete account of the fate of unreasonable citi-
zens living in a liberal political order.  The first part of this account 
refers to the transformative political effects of living in a liberal dem-
ocratic regime on unreasonable citizens.  It brings to the fore the in-
evitable effects of the liberal democratic regime on citizens’ devel-
opment and their conception of the good.  The second is about the 
education of children at school and at home. 
The practical political task of containing unreasonable doc-
trines is primarily concerned with the reformation of unreasonable 
citizens over time.  Rawls is aware that when unreasonable doctrines 
grow so strong, it may be too late for the liberal democratic regime.  
The argument for the normative stability of the regime and the ac-
count of containment as transformation points out the need to prevent 
the unreasonable from becoming strong enough to overwhelm the 
liberal political regime.  Steven Macedo points out that liberalism 
constitutes a regime that cannot help but shape citizens’ lives “deeply 
. . . and relentlessly.”163  For Macedo, political liberalism should 
shape people’s commitments and habits “without exactly announcing 
that purpose on their face.”164  This is a necessary political work that 
 
163 STEVEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES: CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE, AND COMMUNITY IN 
LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 59 (1990). 
164 Macedo, supra note 98, at 69. 
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is beyond any “regret, apologies, or adjustment.”165  The account of 
containment as transformation centers on the idea expressed by 
Macedo: transformation of the unreasonable people living in a liberal 
political order without announcing that purpose in their face. 
 
 
165 Id. 
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